The Trump Administration Implements Broad New Tariffs to Achieve Its Trade Policy Goals

The Trump Administration has implemented new tariffs pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, imposing between 10 to 12.5% tariffs on imports from 60 countries, collectively accounting for 99% of U.S. imports. The move follows an investigation by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) into unfair trade practices in these countries, specifically by allegedly permitting goods imported into those countries made with forced labor. The tariffs took effect on July 24, concurrent with the expiration of similar tariff rates imposed under Section 122 of the Trade Act for balance-of-payments deficits, which were implemented by the Trump Administration after the Supreme Court struck down other tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).

The new Section 301 tariffs are widely seen as an effort by the Trump Administration to impose, through other trade authorities, a global tariff mechanism similar to what the Administration had attempted using IEEPA.

Overview: Section 301 and the Current Tariff Landscape

The Administration has continued to pursue tariffs as the centerpiece of its trade policy following the Supreme Court’s decision striking down IEEPA tariffs in February. This has included a number of assertive steps, culminating in the new forced-labor tariffs under Section 301 – with additional, potential tariff actions on the horizon. 

While importers continue to pursue refunds for the unlawfully collected IEEPA tariffs through the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (“CAPE”) system, the Administration has not created a process to refund all IEEPA tariffs. One major category of unrefunded IEEPA tariffs is liquidated entries. The Administration has taken the position it cannot refund these entries without a court order. In response, the Court of International Trade issued an order in all pending IEEPA refund lawsuits requiring the Administration to issue those refunds after importers submit the required documentation through CAPE. Importers who have not filed suit that have liquidated entries for which they paid IEEPA tariffs remain in limbo with regard to refunds of those tariffs.

After the Supreme Court ruling striking down the use of IEEPA to impose tariffs, the Administration looked to other authorities to impose tariffs. Hours after the Supreme Court’s ruling on the IEEPA tariffs, President Trump imposed a 10% across-the-board tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2132), a never-before-used statute that authorizes the president to impose temporary quotas or import duties of up to 15% for up to 150 days to address “large and serious balance-of-payments deficits.” (See our previous alert on these tariffs, “As the Process to Refund IEEPA Tariffs Takes Shape, the White House Invokes Other Laws to Impose Tariffs.”). These 122 tariffs were challenged, and the Court of International Trade subsequently found the 122 tariffs to be unlawful because the President’s proclamation imposing the 122 tariffs failed to meet the statutory requirement for “fundamental international payments problems.” That ruling has been stayed pending an ongoing appeal to the Federal Circuit and litigation will ultimately determine whether the 122 tariffs were lawful. In the interim, the 122 tariffs expired on July 24.

In parallel to the Section 122 tariffs, the USTR initiated investigations under Section 301 into the acts, policies, and practices of 60 economies to examine whether any of the economies subject to these investigations fail to prohibit or to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced wholly or in part with forced labor, and whether such failure is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. In June, USTR concluded that all 60 countries engaged in unfair trade practices related to forced labor, and invited public comment and testimony on whether to impose tariffs on these countries. 

USTR’s investigation concluded that 54 countries have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam. USTR also concluded that six countries have imposed a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor, but failed to effectively enforce the prohibition. These six countries are Canada, Ecuador, the European Union, Indonesia, Mexico, and Pakistan.

Accordingly, under the new 301 tariffs, the following rates are effective as of July 24:

• 10% tariffs for countries that: (i) impose a forced labor import prohibition; (ii) have committed to impose and enforce such a prohibition through an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade; or (iii) have imposed a partial regime with the effect of preventing the importation of certain forced labor goods.
  
  • These countries are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom.
• 10 percent or 12.5 percent, net of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) rate, for products of the European Union, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Switzerland that are not otherwise subject to specific product exemptions listed in Annexes to the Federal Register Notice.  
• 12.5 percent for all other investigated economies. These include large trading partners like China and Australia, as well as countries that are generally not significant trading partners, such as Angola, Guyana, and Libya. 

The announced tariffs include specific product exemptions listed, including (i) raw materials that if subject to the proposed additional tariffs could lead to the unavailability of domestic supply; (ii) products that could cause economy-wide disruptions if subject to the proposed additional tariffs; (iii) certain products that cannot be grown or produced in sufficient quantities in the United States or obtained from other sources; (iv) products that if exempted from these tariffs would encourage economies to enact and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition; and (v) articles for which additional tariffs may not contribute substantially to the elimination of the acts, policies, and practices determined to be actionable in the investigations. The tariffs also exempt certain materials already covered by the Section 232 tariffs, including steel, aluminum, and copper. 

Implications

The latest developments confirm that despite the Supreme Court’s ruling on IEEPA tariffs, the Administration plans to continue using available tariff authorities to impose broad-based tariffs on imports. Importers should expect the Administration to continue to make tariffs the centerpiece of its international trade policy. The current rates, however, may not be static for a number of reasons:

• The USTR continues other Section 301 investigations into excess manufacturing capacity, which may result in yet even greater tariffs on certain countries.
• At the same time, importers have already filed two lawsuits against the Section 301 forced-labor tariffs in the Court of International Trade. It is not clear whether these tariffs will survive judicial scrutiny given the President’s authority under Section 301 to address unfair trade practices, and given that USTR formally went through the required procedural steps, including public notice and comment. Given prior successful court challenges and statements by Administration officials regarding tariffs, the outcome is uncertain and merits monitoring by importers.
• Likewise, as the Administration has frequently relied on broad tariffs to use as leverage in bilateral trade negotiations, there is the possibility that some of these tariff rates will be adjusted in the future to the extent that certain countries reach new trade agreements with the United States.

These actions underscore the importance of importers submitting accurate entries with respect to value, country of origin, and classification of merchandise. As explained in our prior alert (“As Tariffs Rise and Enforcement Intensifies, The False Claims Act Poses Increasing Risks for Importers and Their Partners,”) the Trump Administration has prioritized enforcement of the trade laws, and higher tariffs can lead to higher penalties.

This memorandum is a summary for general information and discussion only and may be considered an advertisement for certain purposes. It is not a full analysis of the matters presented, may not be relied upon as legal advice, and does not purport to represent the views of our clients or the Firm. Greta L. Nightingale, an O’Melveny partner licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia; David J. Ribner, an O’Melveny partner licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and New York; and Alexander N. Ely, an O’Melveny counsel licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia, contributed to the content of this newsletter. The views expressed in this newsletter are the views of the authors except as otherwise noted.

© 2026 O’Melveny & Myers LLP. All Rights Reserved. Portions of this communication may contain attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please direct all inquiries regarding New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct to O’Melveny & Myers LLP, 1301 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 1700, New York, NY, 10019, T: +1 212 326 2000.