DOJ’s New Fraud Division Directive Sets Enforcement Priorities, Centralizes Oversight, and Previews New Whistleblower Incentives

The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has issued a series of significant policy announcements that provide a detailed roadmap of its current enforcement focus. On October 1, 2026, Colin M. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General for the National Fraud Enforcement Division (“Fraud Division”)—the DOJ component established in April 2026 to consolidate the investigation and prosecution of fraud against the government and U.S. taxpayers¹—issued the Fraud Division’s first comprehensive corporate enforcement guidance and directed the “design and implement[ation] of policies and programs that appropriately incentivize whistleblowers” to report misconduct.² The Directive follows DOJ’s April 2026 creation of the Fraud Division,³ which consolidated the Criminal Division’s Tax Section and Health Care Fraud Unit and parts of the Market, Government and Consumer Fraud Unit, both of which had been part of DOJ’s prior Fraud Section, now renamed the White-Collar and Corporate Enforcement Section. The Fraud Division has been tasked with “leading [DOJ’s] efforts to investigate, prosecute, and remedy fraud affecting the Federal government, Federally funded programs, and private citizens.”⁴

The Directive, along with the August announcement that approximately 500 attorneys and staff would be transferred to the Fraud Division, further signals a potential increase in investigation and enforcement activity that had waned since the start of the second Trump administration.⁵ Statements by Assistant Attorney General Tysen Duva at a conference the day before the Directive’s release underscore increased enforcement activity across the Criminal Division and the importance of self-disclosure and engagement with DOJ prosecutors.⁶

Companies operating in key Fraud Division priority areas—health care, government contracting, and cross-border trade—should consider early engagement with counsel to evaluate compliance and potential self-disclosure options. 

Key Takeaways:

• Fraud Division-specific enforcement priorities defined. The Directive identifies four priority areas—health care fraud, government contract and procurement fraud, tax evasion, and tariff and trade fraud—and instructs prosecutors to focus corporate investigations on those categories. These mirror the areas of focus announced early in the Trump Administration (See our alert DOJ Announces Dramatic Shift in Enforcement Priorities and Resources, Potentially Reshaping White-Collar Enforcement Landscape).
• Ten “great weight” charging factors. When evaluating whether to bring charges or negotiate resolutions, Fraud Division prosecutors must give “great weight” to a non-exhaustive list of ten factors, including management involvement, concealment from government agencies, duration of the offense, multi-district scope, loss exceeding $25 million, and conduct involving immigration offenses or support for foreign adversaries.
• Centralized oversight through the Corporate Enforcement Section. The Directive mandates that all Fraud Division prosecutors work closely with the Corporate Enforcement Section at every phase of corporate investigations, from intake through resolution. The Section will also take primary responsibility for monitoring compliance with corporate criminal resolutions.
• Additional whistleblower incentive programs on the horizon. Division leadership has been directed to “design and implement policies and programs that appropriately incentivize whistleblowers to bring forward credible information pertaining to fraud,” including those who participated in the misconduct—raising the stakes for companies to ensure robust internal reporting mechanisms and to evaluate internal complaints.
• National security considerations embedded in fraud enforcement. The Fraud Division’s mandate prioritizes conduct with national security dimensions, such as sanctions evasion, defense procurement, and trade and customs fraud that funds foreign adversaries. Companies should therefore expect the Fraud Division to be involved in matters that might once have been handled mainly by other DOJ components or the Department of Homeland Security. 

The Fraud Division’s Priorities and Charging Factors

DOJ adopts “an aggressive, all-tools approach” to the Division’s priorities while cautioning against overbroad enforcement that could interfere with legitimate business operations.⁷

The four priorities are: 

1. “health care fraud,” including “distribution of controlled-substances” and “violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act”; 
2. fraud affecting “the public trust or financial integrity” through “procurement, government contracts, or other government functions”; 
3. “significant evasion of internal or external revenue”; and 
4. “tariff evasion, importation of goods or services, or forced labor.”⁸

In addition to following the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations and the Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (“CEP”),⁹ Fraud Division prosecutors must give “great weight” to whether the conduct at issue includes:

1. management knowledge or involvement; 
2. concealment or obstruction; 
3. conduct lasting at least three years; 
4. threats to safety or security, including military readiness; 
5. substantial hardship to a taxpayer-funded program; 
6. effects on multiple taxpayer-funded programs; 
7. conduct spanning at least three federal districts; 
8. at least 25 victims or $25 million in loss; 
9. exfiltration of U.S. dollars to support foreign adversaries; and 
10. immigration offenses.¹⁰

Role of the Corporate Enforcement Section

The Corporate Enforcement Section within the Fraud Division will oversee corporate matters from intake through resolution and monitor compliance with corporate criminal resolutions.¹¹ As reflected in the Directive, Fraud Division prosecutors must report ongoing investigations, new matters, and major developments to the Section Chief promptly and must work with the Section throughout the life of a matter. In addition to this oversight and coordination function, the Section has primary responsibility for evaluating compliance programs, disclosure obligations, and other issues following a corporate resolution.

Whistleblower Incentives

The Directive includes a requirement that Fraud Division leadership, “in consultation with law enforcement partners [ ] design and implement policies and programs that appropriately incentivize whistleblowers to bring forward credible information pertaining to fraud.”¹² Additionally, Fraud Division leadership should “provide the public with transparency to the extent possible regarding those policies and programs.”¹³ This guidance builds on the various DOJ memoranda and programs announced over the last several years aimed at providing structure and additional incentives to encourage self-disclosure and whistleblower reporting. (See our alerts, DOJ’s New Department-Wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy Incentivizes Early Disclosure of Corporate Misconduct and Standardizes Criminal Division Policy; DOJ Declines Prosecution of Company Following Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Cooperation in Export Control Matter; DOJ Announces Dramatic Shift in Enforcement Priorities and Resources, Potentially Reshaping White-Collar Enforcement Landscape; DOJ Issues Status Report on Pilot Programs for Corporate Whistleblowers and Compensation Clawbacks and Supplements its Guidance for Evaluating Corporate Compliance Programs.) 

AAG Duva’s Comments Underscore Emphasis on Disclosure, Engagement, and Increased Enforcement

On September 30, 2026—the day before the Directive’s release—AAG Duva’s comments at GIR Live: Annual Investigations Meeting New York 2026 were consistent with the Directive’s themes. For example, Duva encouraged timely disclosure and engagement with prosecutors on corporate criminal issues, emphasizing in-person over remote engagement.¹⁴ Duva noted the potential benefits of disclosure, including the possibility of a declination, and cautioned against lengthy pre-disclosure internal investigations.¹⁵ In remarks about the Criminal Division’s newly renamed White-Collar and Corporate Enforcement Section—the former home of much of the new Fraud Division’s work—Duva signaled increased Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) enforcement activity, an area that had been a focus of corporate criminal investigations, but that had slowed significantly in the second Trump administration,¹⁶ as well as foreshadowing the announcement of upcoming “large” corporate resolutions related to FCPA, “health and safety”, and money laundering.¹⁷

Broader Implications

The Directive establishes a seemingly more aggressive Fraud Division with defined priorities, charging factors, and centralized oversight within the Corporate Enforcement Section. The Directive also heralds forthcoming policies and programs to encourage whistleblower reporting. These measures signal that corporate enforcement may soon be on the rise, and companies operating in priority sectors would benefit from assessing existing compliance programs and whistleblower programs to determine whether there are risks to mitigate.

¹ See Press Release, Department of Justice Announces Creation of Fraud Division (Apr. 7, 2026); see also Law360, DOJ Outlines New Corporate Fraud Enforcement Priorities (Oct. 1, 2026).
² Directive 26-12: Corporate Enforcement in the Fight Against Fraud, Memorandum from Colin M. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, National Fraud Enforcement Division, to All Fraud Division Personnel (Oct. 1, 2026), at 5 (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1463571/dl?inline) (the “Directive”).
³ See generally Press Release, Department of Justice Announces Creation of Fraud Division (Apr. 7, 2026); Law360, DOJ Outlines New Corporate Fraud Enforcement Priorities (Oct. 1, 2026); The Fraud Division’s Enforcement Priorities, Memorandum from Colin M. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, National Fraud Enforcement Division, to All Fraud Division Personnel (Aug. 13, 2026), available at https://www.justice.gov/d9/2026-08/fraud_division_priorities_memo_final.pdf (“August 2026 Memorandum”).
⁴ See National Fraud Enforcement Division, About the National Fraud Enforcement Division (last updated Aug. 7, 2026). 
⁵ August 2026 Memorandum at 2. 
⁶ Gaspard Le Dem, Fraud Section shake-up an “opportunity” to rebuild, DOJ official says, Global Investigations Review (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/just-anti-corruption/article/fraud-section-shake-opportunity-rebuild-doj-official-says. 
⁷ Directive 26-12 at 1.
⁸ Id. at 3–4.
⁹ Id. at 2; Department of Justice Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, (Mar. 10, 2026) available at https://www.justice.gov/dag/media/1430731/dl?inline. 
¹⁰ Directive 26-12 at 2. 
¹¹ Id. at 2–3.
¹² Id. at 5. 
¹³ Id.
¹⁴ Gaspard Le Dem, Fraud Section shake-up an “opportunity” to rebuild, DOJ official says, Global Investigations Review (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/just-anti-corruption/article/fraud-section-shake-opportunity-rebuild-doj-official-says. 
¹⁵ Id.
¹⁶ Id.
¹⁷ Id.

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